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Abstract
Russian interference within Western Balkan affairs has successfully inhibited their accession to
the European Union (EU). This paper explains how the relationship between Serbia and Russia
developed since the end of the Cold War and what the foreign relations between the two
countries, and other external actors, will look like in the future. Exploring this relationship will
illustrate the importance of historical backgrounds within international relations and could give
insight on what Serbia’s future accession to the EU will look like. The first part of this paper will
present a brief background on EU relations with Serbia and the power of Serbian minorities in
neighboring countries. Afterwards, a comparative event history analysis and quantitative data
from the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, the Government of the Republic of Serbia,
the Serbian National Bank, Eurobarometer and the Observatory of Economic Complexity will be
used together to gather evidence of Russian interference throughout different institutional aspects
of Serbia. Agreements, public opinion, military exercises and direct / indirect actions will be
used to assess the amount of Russian interference and its effects on Serbia and the Serbian
minorities that exist in other countries within the Western Balkans. Additionally, an analysis of
Serbian political parties and the recent elections bolsters the findings that the current two-track
policy, which involves extensive cooperation with Russia and Serbia, will reach a breaking point
and Serbia will have to choose one primary ally.
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Introduction
Russia has shown an increasing interest in the Western Balkan region in the last couple of
decades, and this area has become a stage for geopolitical competition between the East and the
West. Russia’s numerous policy initiatives aimed at Serbia and the Serbian minorities in the
neighboring countries, like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo, have been part of
a larger plan aimed at obstructing the integration of the Western Balkan states with Euro-Atlantic
democratic structures and maintaining an area of instability and frozen conflicts in European
Union’s (EU) near neighborhood. Russia’s policy has successfully interfered with internal
Balkan affairs and has become increasingly effective due to the EU states’ diminishing support
for Balkan countries’ European integration (Szpala 2014, 1).
While Russia presents itself as a major actor which assists Serbia and the Western Balkan
states, it exercises most of its power through increasing energy dependence and promoting
instability within the region. In reality, the European Union is a more significant trade partner
than Russia to the region and is the main actor contributing to Serbia’s development. Serbia and
its minority populations serve as important actors in the Western Balkans and control the
stability of the region through the political power that they possess. The Serbian-EU accession
talks and the Russian attempts to thwart them are contributing directly to the current political
climate in the Western Balkans. Therefore, this paper will attempt to explain how the
relationship between Serbia and Russia developed since the end of the Cold War and what the
foreign relations between the two countries, and other external actors, will look like in the future.
Exploring this relationship will illustrate the importance of historical backgrounds within
international relations and could give insight on what Serbia’s future accession to the EU will
look like.

Literature Review
EU Relations with Serbia
The European Union is the most important foreign trading and investment
partner of Serbia, a state that is struggling to increase the attractiveness of its own market
environment to attract as many foreign direct investors as possible. At the same time, Serbia is
attempting to strengthen its strategic position and importance to the European Union even before
entering the European Union. Within Serbia, unemployment has fallen below 20 percent and
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exports increased by almost 50 percent from 2009 to 2014. Considering its geographic position
and connections with countries of the Western Balkans, Serbia is an important junction point for
Europe and the Western Balkans (Vošta & Janković 2016, 122).

Power of Serbian Minorities in Neighboring Countries
Serbian ethnic minorities living in Western Balkan countries are used by the Serbian
Government to exacerbate political conflicts and inter-ethnic conflicts throughout the region by
using their geopolitical influence. Russia’s strengthening of their influence among Serbian
minorities allows Moscow to influence the internal situations in Montenegro, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Kosovo through pressuring authorities in Belgrade. For example, Serbian
minorities were used to cause unrest and turmoil in Montenegro after their elections in October
of 2016. After the pro- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) incumbent Prime Minister,
Milo Đukanović was elected, powerful Russo-Serbian criminal forces attempted to kill Milo
through a coup d’état (Politico 2017). The coup was allegedly orchestrated by two Russian
intelligence officers who are currently on trial for their crimes. These actions indicate that
Serbian minorities still play a strong role in neighboring countries, like Montenegro, and some
will take drastic action to prevent countries from Westernizing and joining NATO.
Serbian nationalist minorities within Bosnia and Herzegovina have hindered its overall
progress to conform to European Union standards. The Republic of Srpska held a referendum in
September of 2016 that resulted in 90 percent of voters supporting secession from the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. European institutions have deemed this referendum illegitimate, but
the inter-ethnic and political consequences still impact the country (Bashkurti 2016).
Kosovo’s independence is still not recognized by Serbia and has always been a
contentious subject in negotiations between the European Union and Serbia. Serbian minorities
face economic exclusion through lack of access to employment, limited political participation
and poor access to public services, including education and justice (Minority Rights Group 2017)
Some Kosovar Serbs are heavily influenced by Belgrade and took guidance from Serbia when it
demanded that they boycott the parliamentary elections in September of 2007. Additionally, the
top official of Belgrade for Kosovo, Marko Djuric, said that the majority of the Serbian
population will use dinar in Kosovo and not the euro. The use of the Serbian local currency in
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Kosovo is evidence of Belgrade using its Serbian minority group in Kosovo as a source of
instability (Bashkurti 2016).
Serbia’s influence in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo over the last
decade show that significant pressure will be needed to quell the interference of Serbian
minorities within internal politics and stability of the region. The interference and instability are
thought to be fueled by Russia, but most scholars are unsure of how the European Union and
Russian influence will affect Serbia. This paper will seek to prove that Russian interference
exists in Serbia throughout its trading industry, energy sector and the political landscape.

Methodology
A comparative event history analysis of scholarly articles and quantitative data from the
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, the Government of the Republic of Serbia, the
Serbian National Bank, Eurobarometer and the Observatory of Economic Complexity will be
used together to gather evidence of Russian interference throughout different institutional aspects
of Serbia. The timeline focus of this inquiry will begin with the end of the Cold War until present
day because that marked the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Most of the
quantitative data will focus on the last decade to provide relevant statistics and accurate
assessments of the current situation between Russia and Serbia. Historical relevance, beginning
with the 20th century, will be taken into account to properly frame the political environment of
Serbia and the Western Balkans. Assessing the amount of interference and its effects will be
measured through Russian influence on Serbia and the Serbian minorities that exist in other
countries within the Western Balkans. Types of agreements, public opinion, direct and indirect
actions will be recorded to draw the proper conclusions.
This paper will survey the international relationship that exists between Serbia and Russia
and analyze how Russia has tried to influence Serbia over the last two and half decades and what
Russia’s intentions might be in conducting such activities, such as providing military equipment
or financial resources. A historical reflection of the bilateral relationship between Serbia and
Russia will be presented first to frame this empirical discussion. The Russian influence over
Serbian and other Western Balkan elections, or attempt to influence them, will also be analyzed
and discussed in a broader sense. The paper will explore any connections between Serbia’s
candidacy as an EU member state and Russia’s behavior towards Serbia.
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History of the Serbian Political Landscape
The history of Serbs begins during the reign of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans when
Albanian Muslims were the privileged group compared to the Orthodox Serbs. After the Balkan
Wars from 1912-1913, the Serbs were victorious and had a strong position right before the
formation of Yugoslavia in 1918. The second World War changed the power dynamics because
Italy sponsored Kosovo and it became part of Greater Albania. The Serbs took over Yugoslavia
in 1945 in the name of brotherhood and unity. Albania challenged Serbian power once again by
becoming fully autonomous in 1974 and then Milošević brought Serbians to power once again
(Vujacic 1996, 769). Each of these occurrences that involved role reversals in power invoked
unpleasant memories and instances of persecution that reinforced the poor memories. In addition
to the geopolitical differences, there was a status-differentiation along ethnic and national lines
(Vujacic 1996, 770). The constant revival of negative historical memories in the Western
Balkans led to the increase in solidarity based around ethnicity and geo-political factors.
Russians and Serbs share a common history that has played an important role in their
relationship throughout the 20th and 21st century. Their shared religious beliefs of Christian
Orthodoxy, historical struggle against the Ottoman Turks and struggling on the same side in the
First and Second World Wars explains Russia’s attempts to conjure Balkan nationalism for their
benefit in Serbia and the neighboring Balkan states (Vujacic 1996, 776). This shared history
explains Russia’s reluctance to support any form of military intervention against Serbia.

Serbian-Russian Relationship
Russian Influence on Serbia
The Western Balkan area is an important region for Russia because it is an area where
other regional actors, like the United States (U.S.) and the European Union, are competing for
influence. The region is also a prime location for the proposed energy supply routes that will lead
to Europe and carry Russian natural resources. Serbia is the largest country in the Western
Balkans and has significant Serbian minorities within neighboring countries that influence their
political systems as well, so successfully influencing Serbians is in the best interest of Russia to
promote their initiatives within the region. Moscow influences Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, by
increasing its energy dependence on Russia, supporting its position on Kosovo and its refusal to
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recognize it as a sovereign state, developing contacts with Serbian minorities in the region,
fueling separatist movements and by gaining control of Serbian businesses (Szpala 2014, 1).
Russia increased Serbian energy dependence by increasing its control over Serbia’s fuel
and gas sector in 2008 by acquiring the Serbian company NIS (Szpala 2014, 2). Through this
acquisition, Russia has gained full control of the oil processing sector in Serbia and controls 82%
of the fuel market (Bijanić 2012) Through NIS, Russia has control over Serbia’s only gas depot,
therefore having a monopoly over the extraction of gas and oil within Serbia. Now, 98.8% of
Serbian gas consumption is from Russia (Szpala 2014, 2). Apart from the energy sector and gas
imports, Russia’s role in Serbia’s economy has been insignificant. Russia’s investments, from
2005 to 2013, only consisted of 4.5% of all foreign investments in Serbia (National Bank of
Serbia 2017).
Russian leaders have visited Serbia to use their prestige to conjure Serbian affection
toward Russia. President Dmitri Medvedev visited Serbia in 2009 and Prime Minister, at the
time, Vladimir Putin visited in 2011. In an attempt to improve relations with Belgrade, both
leaders committed to investing over a billion U.S. dollars, but this money still has not been
invested to this day (Beta 2011). Serbian proponents of Russia see Moscow as a valuable partner
and Serbian media often publicizes potential development aid and other Russian investment
plans to the public. 47 percent of Serbs believe that Russia is the largest supplier of
developmental aid to Serbia, when in reality, the U.S. and EU provide 89.49% of the
developmental funds (European Integration Office 2014, 19). Putin’s visit to Belgrade was aimed
at strengthening the pro-Russian groups within the Serbian ruling elite and confirm that it is in
Russia’s zone of influence (Szpala 2014, 7)
Serbia granted Russia preferential tax rates in 2000 to increase trade between the two
countries. Russia still has not ratified this agreement, but it has increased trade. Russia accounts
for only 10% of Serbia’s imports and its exports to Russia have decreased from 7.7% in 2012 to
5.4% in 2016 (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia 2014, 1). It is important to remember
that Serbia has not received substantial economic benefits from dealing with Russia recently.
Seven agreements, memorandums and protocols have been signed with Russia, but they mostly
address the performance of agreements that are already active and do not build the current
relationship between the two countries (Szpala 2014, 7).
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Geographic proximity between Serbia and Russia also affects their current relationship.
Russia has established numerous institutions dedicated to Russian interests within Serbia, such as
branch offices of The Russian World organization and representatives of the International Fund
for the Unity of Orthodox Nations within Sad and Belgrade in 2005 (Szpala 2014, 4). Other
offices for Russian organizations like the Russian Institute of Strategic Research and the
Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund have been established in Serbia as well. This increase in
Russia focused institutions have led to the creation of Serbian language versions of Russian news
portals like their news channel RT or their Voice of Russia broadcasting network.
Russia has financially supported far-right and eurosceptic organizations, political parties
and nongovernmental organizations with a favorable view of Moscow in Serbia, such as: Dveri,
Orbaz, Nasi and Treca Srbija. Russia tries to convince Serbs that joining Western organizations
like NATO and the European Union are not in their best interests by promoting instability.
Russia repeatedly tries to portray themselves as a significant ally that contributes developmental
aid and as an irreplaceable trade partner. The pro-Russian organizations established in Serbia
promote the shared culture between Serbia and Russia and criticize the pro-European actions of
the current government (Szpala 2014, 5).
Military cooperation between Russia and Serbia is another aspect of their dynamic
relationship. In 2013, Serbia and Russia signed a joint military cooperation agreement and in
2014 they both engaged in a military exercise involving 200 Russian paratroopers (Radio Free
Europe, Radio Liberty [RFE/RL] 2014). This military exercise is an important connection
between Russia and Serbia that sends signals to external actors like the U.S. and the European
Union; the exercise took place in the northern city of Nikinci, which is only 50 kilometers from
the border with the NATO member state of Croatia (Ibid). A month afterward, Putin visited
Belgrade for a Serbian military parade. Serbia implemented two military exercises with Russia
armed forces in 2015 (deemed “Slavic Brotherhood” exercises), conducted two more Slavic
Brotherhood 700-troop military assault exercises with Russia and Belarus in Serbia in November
of 2016 and another military exercise in June of 2017 (Dragojlo 2016a; RFE/RL 2017). The
military exercises and visit by Putin are messages Moscow is sending to the world that indicate
Russia has an ally within Europe. While Serbia has expressed it will not join NATO, it is a
Partnership for Peace partner and recently deepened its cooperation with NATO in 2015 through
an individual Partnership Action Plan (NATO 2017). The Partnership Action Plan is extremely
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relevant for Serbia’s foreign relations because it is considered the highest level of cooperation
possible for a non-member country with NATO (Dragojlo 2016b). Serbs and their political
parties have not forgotten the 1999 NATO bombings and still blame the “West” for Kosovo’s
secession from Yugoslavia (Marcinkowski 2015, 59). Since Vučić has taken office, Serbia has
upheld a policy of military neutrality, which is how it can still have ties with the European
Union, NATO and Russia at the same time. This relationship will cause difficulties between the
European Union and NATO in future talks of accession.

Analysis
Russia has proven that it is directly challenging Serbia’s accession to the European Union
and the process of reconciliation in the Western Balkans through direct interference in Serbian
affairs. Currently, Russia does not have much to offer to Serbia’s authorities, which are reluctant
to make more concessions towards Russia. However, Moscow has already gained a strong
position in Serbia, which is due to the country’s dependence on Russian natural resources, and in
particular, strong support for Russian policy on the part of Serbian elites and society. The
traditional pro-Russian attitudes have been strengthened as a result of a series of Russia-inspired,
wide-ranging soft power initiatives which have proved so successful that a large part of society
has begun to believe that Russia’s interests are consistent with Serbia’s. The relationship
between Russia and Serbia is defined by Moscow’s goal to sabotage EU efforts to increase rule
of law and other democratic principles within Serbia that would help them accede to the
European Union. If Russia is able to convince enough Serbians and elites to abandon accession
to the European Union and align with Russia, it would be a significant blow to the Western
Balkan region and decrease stability in the region.

Serbia and the European Union
The European Union has been an important actor that has affected the dynamics of the
relationship between Serbia and Russia. Establishing stability and rule of law in the Western
Balkans has been recognized as a high priority for the European Union since the late 90’s and is
still at the forefront of EU foreign policy. Bilateral negotiations for accession between the
European Union and Serbia began in March of 2012 when Serbia was declared as an official
candidate country. Serbia is in the process of fulfilling the various 35 chapters of the acquis
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communautaire; it has completed two so far and has 12 open chapters (European Commission
2017). Visa free travel from Serbia to the European Union existed since December of 2009; over
9,000 ERASMUS (European student exchange program) participants existed between 2015-2016
and the EU invested over 30 million euro to modernize Serbian universities from 2012 to 2014
(Ibid). Customs duty free trade between the two entities since 2000 has led to the European
Union being Serbia’s largest trading partner; European Union trade accounted for 65 percent of
the foreign direct investment in Serbia for 2016 (Ibid).
Table 1- Foreign Direct Investments in Serbia in 2014 (In EUR Millions and in %)
Country
In Millions of EUR
In %
Netherlands

372,685

33,6

Austria

119,231

10,7

Italy

101,130

9,1

Greece

89,696

8,0

Luxembourg

85,460

7,7

United Kingdom

57.619

5,2

Hungary

55,827

5,0

France

51,509

4,6

Denmark

49,809

4,5

Germany

36,524

3,3

EU 28

1.109,324

100

From the National Bank of Serbia (2015)
Recently, the President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Junker, announced a
plan for enlargement of the Western Balkan states in the 2017 State of the Union address. This
announcement outlined more definitive plans for the Balkan states to accede to the European
Union based on merit and fulfilling the acquis communautaire, the stringent and tiered level of
requirements that need to be met before accession to the European Union is granted by the other
member states. This renewed the EU’s vision of the region as a geostrategic investment in a
8

stable, strong and united Europe based on common values (European Commission 2018a). The
new strategy clearly spells out that the European Union is open to further accession when the
individual countries have met the criteria and it has stated that fundamental reforms and good
neighborly relations are necessary. Constant Russian interference and Serbia’s choice to align
with Russia will jeopardize the future accession of Serbia to the European Union. Serbia is in a
better position than most Western Balkan countries on meeting the proposed date of 2025 for
accession because it is one of two Western Balkan states already engaged in accession
discussions. It is important to know that the proposed date of 2025 is not a strict deadline for all
Western Balkan states to accede to the European Union and that only a few of the states can
accede, or none at all (European Western Balkans 2018). The leader of the Directorate General
on Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR), Commissioner Johannes Hahn
officially presented the new EU strategy and privately met with Serbian President Aleksandar
Vučić in early February of 2018 (European Western Balkans 2018). Commissioner Hahn urged
Serbia to implement the hard reforms and to establish a diplomatic relationship with Kosovo so
that the state can accede by 2025. President Vučić and Commissioner Hahn spoke at a joint news
conference together and Hahn said that, “the EU perspective is real, and the country now has a
unique opportunity to grasp it” (RFE/RL 2018). After reaffirming that the European Commission
will always be there to support Serbia, Vučić said that there are a number of obstacles in Serbia’s
path and that it will be up to the citizens to choose Serbia’s path. Commissioner Hahn stated that
the EU will not support bilateral disputes and made it clear that Serbia must implement a legally
binding normalization agreement with Kosovo before it can join the European Union, which falls
under Chapter 35 (Hahn 2018). After meeting with Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic,
Commissioner Hahn said he had a very good and constructive meeting with her (Hahn 2018).
Hahn also met with representatives of Serbia’s civil society, media and opposition parties.
The newly released European strategy sets out an action plan with six concrete flagship
initiatives targeting specific areas of common interest: rule of law, security and migration, socioeconomic development, transport and energy connectivity, digital agenda, reconciliation and
good neighborly relations (European Commission 2018b). In addition to these clear goals and
thresholds that must be met, the European Commission plans to gradually increase funding to the
Western Balkans under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance until 2020 (Ibid). In 2018
alone, €1.07 billion of pre-accession assistance for the Western Balkans is already allocated, on
9

top of the nearly €9 billion given from 2007-2017 (Hahn 2018). In addition to Commissioner
Hahn, EU ministers of Foreign Affairs, President Juncker and High Representative Federica
Mogherini plan on visiting the Western Balkan region in 2018. This official release of a more
tangible path for accession of the Western Balkans by 2025, increased funding to the region,
private meetings between Commissioner Hahn and Serbian officials and the joint press
conference with the Serbian President can be seen as direct threats to Russian influence within
Serbia. The European Union also plans on increasing Serbia’s socio-economic development by
assisting them in their World Trade Organization accession process. These are all political
messages that the European Union is sending to Russia through the promotion of liberal values
in the Western Balkans, specifically within Serbia. Russia could decide to intensify their
relations with Serbia as a result of these political advances by the European Union or instigate
different Serbian groups to increase conflict between Serbia and Kosovo to interfere with the
accession and negotiation process.

Serbia and its Mutual Connections with the European Union
The potential accession of Serbia to the European Union is not only for geopolitical
reasons, but for economic ones as well. The European Union could use Serbia as a platform for
economic interests because of its physical connection between Europe, Asia, the Middle East and
the Mediterranean. Serbia can also secure transit from EU countries to the East, and vice versa,
especially with the transportation of oil, gas and other energy infrastructure related entities. The
European Union is also interested in extending its political influence on Serbia and its nearby
territories (Vošta & Janković 2016, 120).
The European Union would like to expand its banking services market to Serbia, extend
its sales network of EU’s wholesale chains and set up new companies to gain duty-free access to
the Russian market (Vošta & Janković 2016, 120). The European Union is also interested in the
fruitful agricultural land Serbia has to offer; both the European Union and Serbia signed an
agreement that began in September of 2017 that allowed EU citizens to purchase natural
resources in Serbia (Ibid). The financial relationship between the European Union and Serbia has
been nurtured by tax breaks, the regulation on conditions and increasing ways of attracting
foreign direct investment within Serbia. For example, the European Union will fund Serbian
investment projects within the manufacturing sector if Serbia ensures the creation of a certain
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number of jobs for a specific amount of euro invested; Serbia needs to ensure the creation of at
least 40 new jobs for an investment of 500,000 euro (Vošta & Janković 2016, 130).
Table 2- Advantages of Serbia for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment
Favorable Geographical Position
 Includes areas with 7.5 million
inhabitants
 It is located on the Balkan Peninsula
and it represents the link between the
Eastern, Western, Northern and
Southern Europe
 Moderate continental climate
Free Trade Agreements
 Interim trade agreement with the EU;
 CEFTA agreement;
 Agreement with the signatory
countries EFTA;
 Free Trade Agreement with Russia;
 Free Trade Agreement with Belarus
 Free Trade Agreement with
Kazakhstan;
 Free Trade Agreement with Turkey;
 The preferential trade regime with the
US.
Fiscal Advantages
 Exemption from VAT payment for the
entry of goods into free zones, as well
as for the provision of transport
services and other services concerning
the entry of goods;
 Exemption from VAT payment for the
turnover of goods and services in the
free zone;
 Exemption from VAT payment for the
turnover of goods among the users of
two free zones;
 Exemption from VAT payment for the
use of energy resources;
 Exemption from individual tax
burdens for direct foreign investment.
Customs Facilities
 Exemption from payment of customs
duties and other import charges for the
goods specified for performing
activities and building of facilities in
the free zone (manufacturing
materials, equipment and construction
material).
Benefits of Local Government
 Local government can bring a decision
on the advantageousness of facilities
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Financial Benefits



Effective Management in the Free Zone (One
Stop Shop)



Total and Fast Customs Procedure




construction and infrastructure on the
territory of the free zone. These
advantages are related to the adoption
of decisions on the exemption from
paying local taxes and fees, which are
the responsibility of local
governments, e.g. urban construction
land management fees, fees and costs
of the municipal administration, fees
for the use of construction land,
charges for urban requirements and
permits, access to local infrastructure
of water and sewerage, local services
taxes etc.
Free movement of capital, profits and
dividends;
Funds from the budget of the Republic
of Serbia for financing investment
projects in the manufacturing and
service-providing sector, which may
be the subject of international trade.
Logistics services at discounted
prices: organization of transport, shift
of the costs, shipping services, agency
services, insurance services, bank job
etc.
Existence of a customs department in
each of the free zones;
Customs procedure in the free zones is
simplified.

From Vošta & Janković 2016, 130-131
The previously described economic benefits for Serbia are major advantages for its
accession the European Union. It is important to remember that the European Union wants
Serbia to join because of their important geopolitical location within an EU safety zone that has a
complex and challenging history. As Vošta and Janković described, the accession of Serbia can
lead to the expansion of the wholesale chains sales network, expansion of the EU’s banking
services market and favorable buying of enterprises (134). Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan are
members of a rival customs union called the Euroasian Economic Union, but the European
Union can use Serbia for the establishment of new joint enterprises for the purpose of duty-free
entry to the markets of these countries (Vošta & Janković 2016, 134).
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The Political and Social Spheres within Serbia
Serbian Politics
Aleksandar Vučić, previous Prime Minister of Serbia and current President, embraced the
two-track policy initiated in 2008 by President Boris Tadíc that seeks EU membership while
maintaining close relations with Russia. After opening negotiations to join the European Union
in 2014, Serbia set a five-year goal to meet all the necessary requirements. Even though Serbia
should be harmonizing its foreign and security policy with the European Union’s, it has not
joined the European Union’s numerous sanctions against Russia.
Serbian President Vučić and scholars familiar with Serbia have stated multiple times that
Serbia’s ability to accede to the European Union or whether to cooperate with Russia will
depend on the will of the citizens. It is important to view the political groups that are based
around gathering support of the citizens and look at which political narratives seem to garner the
most support for these various political groups.
President Vučić’s political party, the Serbian Progressive Party, formed in October of
2008, has become more EU-oriented since its formation, but still cannot fully commit to the
Union’s objectives. The April 24, 2016 national elections that occurred in Serbia were conducted
successfully with the necessary EU chapters for accession in mind; Serbia’s EU accession was a
priority goal defined by the government program. A 2016 European Commission report found
that inclusiveness, transparency, quality of law-making and effective oversight of the executive
need improvement and must be changed (European Commission 2016, 4). The 2016 election had
a 56 percent turnout and the incumbent prime minister, Aleksandar Vučić (Serbian Progressive
Party- SNS) maintained a majority of 131 seats out of the 250 (European Commission 2016, 6).
Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) are coalition partners
that have capitalized on the fragmented opposition forces (Parties and Elections in Europe 2016).
Some members of the SPS are widely perceived to pursue the Kremlin’s objectives and hold
high-level government positions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dačić, and the Ministry
of Energy, Aleksandar Antić (Marcinkowski 2015, 63). While additional stakeholders, like civil
society, were more involved within this election, the European Union called for a more enabling
environment for civil society to ensure a comprehensive policy dialogue (European Commission
2016, 8). The Serbian Progressive Party won the Belgrade local elections in February of 2018
and received around 40 percent of the vote, which signals that this party will likely win the
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majority in the upcoming parliamentary elections next year and Vučić will retain his political
influence within Serbia for the next four years (Čeperković 2018).
Serbia’s Civil Society
Figure 1, within the appendix, shows that the European Union is the leader, by far, of
international development assistance grants to Serbia in the last 15 years, but Figure 2 says that
only 27 percent of Serbian citizens have heard of a project financed by EU funds (Government of
the Republic of Serbia 2016). This finding indicates that there is a large disparity between the
positive actions the European Union is taking within Serbia and the knowledge of any such
activities occurring by the citizens. This disparity could be related to the increased activities
Russia is performing in Serbia to influence public opinion and signal that their efforts are
working. Not only are the Russian efforts to undermine support for the European Union working,
but Figure 4 shows that citizens actually think Russia is donating more money to Serbia than
anyone else; 25 percent of citizens think Russia is the largest donor and 21 percent believe the
European Union is the biggest one (Government of the Republic of Serbia 2016). Figure 3
describes a general decline in Serbian civil society’s support for EU accession from 2009 until
2016. In late 2009, 73 percent of Serbs would have supported EU accession, but in 2016, the
citizens against accession more than doubled and only 47 percent of citizens are pro-accession
(Government of the Republic of Serbia 2016). Figure 5 shows that Serbia’s accession to the
European Union is almost equally viewed as a good, bad or neither good nor bad thing among
the general population (Government of the Republic of Serbia 2016). These various figures
demonstrate that the divided stance of the Serbian government is reflected within civil society as
well and will make the implementation of certain EU chapters more difficult.

Conclusion
Russia has constantly been trying to prevent the Western Balkan countries from joining
the European Union and other “Western” institutions like NATO. This paper explained Russia’s
extensive efforts to discourage Serbia from acceding to the European Union and how Russian
interference within Serbia has impacted its current political affairs and will affect its future
relationships. Growing tensions between Russia and the European Union can directly affect the
accession of Serbia to the European Union in a negative way as well. If Russia continues to
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successfully court enough anti-EU support throughout Serbia and its minorities in the Western
Balkans, then Serbia could regress in its accession progress if they think that it is not in their best
interest to join the European Union.
This paper proves that there is a significant amount of tension between the relationships
that Serbia has between the European Union and Russia. Serbia seems to be increasing its
openness to the European Union based on its increased trade relations, by signing on as a partner
to NATO and agreeing to participate in other EU institutions like the European Defense Agency.
On the other side, Serbia decided to engage in multiple military exercises with Russia every year
since 2014. Russia still has control over some Serbian political elites and is actively trying to
sway the public perceptions held by Serbian civil society. In the near future, the executive branch
of Serbia will need to make a choice and decide whether or not aligning Serbia with the
European Union or Russia is the path that it wants to pursue. Eventually, the current two-track
policy that involves extensive cooperation with Russia and Serbia will reach a breaking point and
Serbia will have to choose one primary ally.
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Appendix:
Figure 1: EU Accession Support

Source: Government of the Republic of Serbia (2016)
Figure 2: Interest in the European Union

Source: Government of the Republic of Serbia (2016)
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Figure 3: EU Accession Support

Source: Government of the Republic of Serbia (2016)
Figure 4: Interest in the European Union

Source: Government of the Republic of Serbia (2016)
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Figure
5: EU
Accessi
on
Suppor
t

Source: Government of the Republic of Serbia (2016)
Figure 6: EU Accession Support

Source: Government of the Republic of Serbia (2016)
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